Central Asia and Putin’s war in Ukraine

Central Asians are caught between economic dependency on Russia and an increasingly strong dislike of Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine. They fear that they may be next.

(Map from The Economist)

BY ASKAT DUKENBAEV

Part I: What are you doing, Russia?

As Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” - as Russia’s war against Ukraine is still called in Central Asia’s pro-Russian mass media – grinds on, more in the region are becoming wary and concerned about staking their bets on Russia, as they have done for so long.

Despite Russia’s traditional and continuing dominance when it comes to (dis-) information, media and political discourse of the region, surveys conducted by Gallup (in 2021 and 2022) and the Central Asian Barometer (in 2022 and 2023), reveal increasing rates of disapproval of their war-mongering northern neighbor.

According to Gallup’s longitudinal studies, approval of Russia’s leadership fell sharply among most of Russia’s neighbors between 2021 and 2022 despite the continued prevalence of Russia’s media and propaganda. For example, within one year after Russia had invaded Ukraine, the approval of Russia dropped 21 points in Kazakhstan (where the percentage of disapproval of the Russian neighbor exceeded the approval), 20 points in Kyrgyzstan, and 8 points in Uzbekistan (and where it dropped a further 17 points in 2023). The Central Asian Barometer also reports low support for Russia’s war in Ukraine in the region. In the spring of 2023 - in striking contrast with 63% support of the war in the Russian Federation itself - only 23% of respondents in Kazakhstan and 33% in Kyrgyzstan believed that Russia’s “special military operation” could be justified.

Russian media, including television, radio, and digital content, maintain a strong presence in Central Asia, creating an overarching (and poisonous) “matrix” of pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation. For instance, according to recent data, half of the population in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and 66% of residents in Kazakhstan read the Russian press at least occasionally.

However, videos and photos of destroyed Ukrainian cities and killed civilians and soldiers, shocking reports and scenes of mass killings and war crimes, have hardly left anyone in the former Soviet Union indifferent to the suffering of Ukrainians, to whom they have had connections for decades. Several hundred thousand Russians fled to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Tens of thousands stayed, while others moved on beyond Central Asia. The influx of people escaping Putin’s mobilization added more negativity to the changing image of Russia among Central Asians.

As the formerly all-dominant center of the imperial Soviet Union (and the preceding tsarist Russia), “Russia proper” has long attracted people from the periphery. (“Russia proper” is defined here as Moscow and its surrounding regions, including St. Petersburg, as well as major metropolitan areas to the east of the Volga River – that is, the areas of the Russian Federation (Rossiya) where historically the Russian population (Russkiye) are a demographic majority. By periphery, the author means the formerly Soviet national republics around Russia, including those from Russophone Central Asia: Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks).

And, as in a typical postcolonial situation, many Central Asians had been regarding Russia with reverence, if not admiration, during the three decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

This attitude can be explained not only by the historically inflicted and internalized notion of “Russian superiority,” but also by the economic opportunities for the millions of desperate migrant workers fleeing from their impoverished Central Asian homelands (30 years after their nominal independence, still under corrupt, mismanaged and authoritarian regimes) to the workforce-needy regions of the Russian Federation. The cultural, political, and especially military images of the Russian metropolis, still perceived as European, continue the historical legacy as the biggest geographical and political power in Northern Eurasia.

During the three decades since gaining independence from the collapsed Soviet Union, Russia’s “soft power” – helped by attractive, elaborate and overpowering mass media – continued to spread and flourish in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries. For long the Russian metropolis seemed a magnet for the people from the “periphery.” But that is not the case after Feb. 24, 2022: Russia’s large-scale war against their former “brethren” of the Soviet Union has pushed the Central Asians to distance themselves from their increasingly opaque, if not dangerous, “older brother,” “ally” and “strategic partner”.

Spiking levels of xenophobia and racism among the war-fevered Russians – partly induced by the increased regulations and restrictions against foreign workers - are making “immigrants of color” a target. (As reported by the observers in Kyrgyzstan, by the end of this year, there will be 13 separate laws dealing with “illegal immigration” in Russia). The worsening situation for Central Asians is making them increasingly swap Russia for other destinations or return to their home countries. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan — a country with only 2.7 million working-age people —about 241,000 Kyrgyz have returned from Russia in the past two years. In 2023, the number of returning migrants was almost double that. As a response to the increased hostility towards its citizens, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan has issued an unprecedented warning against traveling to Russia due to “compelling reasons” related to “additional security measures” and “enhanced control of the passage of foreign citizens across the state border” (on Sept. 5, 2024).

As a result of Kyrgyz leaving Russia - and as another remarkable indication of the changing attitudes and patterns - personal remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan have been declining for two consecutive years, from a 2021 high of 32.6% of GDP to 18.6% in 2023. The same was true for neighboring Tajikistan, where remittances from Russia dropped from a 2022 record high of 49.9% of GDP to 38.4% in 2023. Like Tajikistan, in Uzbekistan, remittances hit a high point in 2022, at 20.6% of GDP, dropping in 2023 to 17.7%. However, robust GDP growth indicators in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will likely create more economic opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Central Asians, motivate them to remain in their homelands and further reduce one of the important leverages of Moscow over this whole region.

Part II: What are you doing, Central Asia?

Let us be clear: for the landlocked Central Asian states, Russia remains the main gatekeeper for trading and transportation routes to Europe, as highlighted during Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan a few weeks ago. The increased cooperation with Turkey via Azerbaijan has not picked up real volumes, and the trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor” has yet to be built and brought to full capacity. It is of utmost importance for the Central Asian nations to open a new window to Europe that could become an alternative exit for the region.

But right now, they are squeezed between the menacing “northern arc” of Russia and China, and the unstable “southern arc” of Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore, Moscow continues to have leverage over the region, which came in handy as Russia started using these countries as a pathway to circumvent the Western sanctions.

If the European Union’s exports to Russia dropped by 53% between 2021 and 2023, on the other hand, Kazakhstan’s exports to its northern neighbor rose by 39%, Kyrgyzstan’s by 90% and Uzbekistan’s by 77%. The picture is even more striking with the sharp increase in the exports of “dual use” goods (that can be used both for civilian and military purposes in Russia, e.g., microprocessors and semiconductors found in consumer electronics like TVs and refrigerators). In the case of Kazakhstan, this export to Russia surged by no less than 401% in 2022 (compared to the previous year), and kept at that high level in 2023. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan boosted its exports of the same goods by 400% in 2022, with a further increase in 2023. Uzbekistan saw an even larger rise, with a 430% increase in 2022 and an additional 38% in 2023.

Overall, Russia still represents about 1/5 of the trade turnover of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, despite the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European Union against several local economic entities caught doing banned business with Russia. However, the Central Asian governments try to avoid complications with the West, not wanting to become a target in the geopolitical crossfire. As a result, in 2023, the government of Kazakhstan tightened controls and banned the export of 106 types of sanctioned products to Russia. A high-ranking Kazakh official reiterated in public the country’s commitment to the sanctions against Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, the banks have started to cancel transactions with their Russian counterparts. And in Uzbekistan, in February 2024, the lower house of parliament passed a bill that would ban banking operations in the country for individuals and legal entities under sanctions. Even if these actions are undertaken merely as a symbolic response to the West’s demands, without many real consequences, the relations between Russia and Central Asia are now showing signs of change due to the diverging strategic interests and historical trajectories.

Part III: After Ukraine - Kazakhstan?

In the future, the Central Asian states will likely continue their balancing act in the conflict between Russia and the West, trying to absorb, if not possible to stay away from, the spreading shockwaves with minimal damage. Despite some longstanding disagreements (e.g., over democratic principles, human rights, political values, and ideology) with the geographically and politically distant Western world, the Central Asian regimes do not necessarily view the West as a threat, unlike the Kremlin. On the contrary, they look forward to finding new ways of cooperation amid the thunder of the Russian full-scale war against Ukraine.

In this regard, one of the urgent measures to address (and prevent) is the spillover to other ex-Soviet states. The states of Central Asia must remain alert – while gradually getting prepared – for the emboldened (or frenzied, especially when defeated) intentions of Putin and the Kremlin and possible steps toward the region, especially, after a “freezing” of the war in Ukraine.

The most likely next target would be Kazakhstan because the NATO member Baltic states are expected to be more resilient and dangerous). Kazakhstan shares no less than 7,600 kilometers (4,722 miles) of land border with Russia. That is the second longest border in the world, after the Canada-U.S. border. There are also three million ethnic Russians (15% of the population), most of whom are supportive of Putin and his actions against Ukraine and perceptive to Moscow’s revanchism. They live compactly in Kazakhstan's northern districts and towns, adjacent to Russia. While such a scenario is considered currently as purely hypothetical (remember the prevailing attitude to the pre-2014 Russia-Ukraine relationship), the majority of Kazakhs are becoming increasingly concerned about the true intentions of the Kremlin and the prospects of getting drawn into some hybrid or even open conflict with its potentially dangerous, often unpredictable, and now openly expansionist northern “strategic partner”, with dramatic consequences for the entire Central Asian region.

Another remarkable example of changing attitudes towards Russia is Uzbekistan, where the leader of one of the two government coalition parties of the national parliament – Alisher Qodirov (Milliy Tiklanish party) – has recently called on establishing a visa regime with the Russian Federation, thus returning the ball to his Russian counterparts who have long been advocating for such a populist measure against Central Asian immigrants in Russia. It is also worth mentioning that Qodirov is known for his outspoken criticism of Russian chauvinism and the Soviet legacy. The very fact that he is allowed to make such widely publicized statements on the sensitive topics of the relationship between Russia and Central Asia is an indication of a significant shift in Uzbekistan’s strictly controlled political discourse. It can be considered a clear message to Moscow.

Understandably, prudence is necessary in relations with Russia due to the great challenges and risks that might be caused by enthusiastic and open preparations against the potential “Russian threat” under the watchful eyes of the northern “strategic partner” (another euphemism used in the Central Asian media for Putin’s Russia). The Russian observers, monitoring the situation across the region, are quick to label the defensive countermeasures as “anti-Russian” and make a political fuss – as a sign of both reprimanding and warning – in the mass media against the disobedient locals. One such “warning measure” comes in the form of provocative pronouncements from leading Russian politicians and even mass-culture celebrities-turned-into-Putin’s-mouthpieces, articulating his hidden agenda against the national sovereignty or even the territorial integrity of the Central Asian states. In August 2022, the former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s social media account published a post referring to Kazakhstan (and Georgia, and by implication, to all the ex-Soviet countries neighboring Russia) as “artificial,” adding that Russia should “restore the borders of our Motherland.” The post was deleted within 10 minutes on the pretense that the account “had been hacked” (the screenshots were saved and circulated), creating an uproar in the Russophone blogosphere). Even though Kazakhstan officially refrained from commenting on the incident, very few people doubt the authenticity of the intentions of the increasingly hawkish Medvedev, referred to by some as Putin’s “attack dog,”

In addition to the (dis-) information attacks, Russia does not shy away from implementing tangible retaliatory measures against an obstinate “ally” in the “near abroad,” usually under the seemingly non-confrontational and politically convenient disguise of “technical problems” or bureaucratic and policy reasons. In October 2024, the Russian agriculture safety agency (Rosselkhoznadzor) temporarily banned imports of tomatoes, peppers, fresh melons, wheat, flax seeds, and lentils from Kazakhstan. The restrictive measure came shortly after Kazakhstan refused to join BRICS, the bloc of emerging economies of which Russia currently holds the presidency. In another case, in the summer of 2022, Russia twice suspended the work of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), for several days each time; independent observers deemed this an act of revenge on Kazakhstan over its lack of support for the invasion of Ukraine. The first suspension took place in June, when the CPC became non-operable for 10 days "because of the discovery of highly dangerous explosives on the seabed" near the port, and then in July, with an attempted 30-day suspension due to the “maintenance issues” (the suspension was lifted after 6 days, probably, as a result of intensive negotiations).

On a final note, the wary Central Asian ruling elites must carefully consider the reality of the power imbalances in the region. This is important – along with good knowledge of the lessons of the region’s history – for taking care of their vital and strategic national interests that might eventually require challenging and changing the Russian hegemonic status quo. This process has already begun in the Middle East, as we witnessed in the case of the Bashar al-Assad regime’s collapse in Syria.

This article is dedicated to the memory of my father, Zhumanbay Dukenbayev (1947-2024).

Dr. Askat Dukenbaev is a scholar and activist from Central Asia. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from Kent State University in 2017. He is currently residing and working in Cleveland, Ohio.