From Munich to Moscow: The Perils of Appeasing Power Hungry Potentates

In this guest post, Myk Mowczan argues that history warns us that Trump's appeasement of Putin will only lead to more instability and conflict, more Russian land grabs and more Ukrainian suffering.

The concept of appeasement in international relations, notably highlighted by the historical failure of the Munich Agreement in 1938, serves as a stark reminder of the dangers inherent in yielding to an aggressor's demands. This historical lesson finds a chilling echo in contemporary geopolitics, particularly in the context of U.S. President Donald Trump's interactions with Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

In 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain believed that by acquiescing to Adolf Hitler's demands over the Sudetenland, he could prevent a larger conflict. He returned from Munich proclaiming "peace for our time," a sentiment that was soon shattered when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, catapulting the world into another devastating war. The lesson here is clear: appeasement often emboldens aggressive leaders, signaling weakness rather than strength.

Drawing parallels to today, Donald Trump's approach to Vladimir Putin, especially concerning the conflict in Ukraine, has been criticized for echoing Chamberlain's strategy. Trump has expressed admiration for Putin, described his annexation of Crimea as "genius," and has suggested that he could negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine swiftly, often without clear conditions favorable or even fair to Ukrainian interests.

Trump’s rhetoric and actions have suggested a policy of conciliation towards Russia, often at the expense of traditional U.S. allies and international norms. Critics argue that Trump's strategy, much like Chamberlain's, might encourage Putin's aggression rather than curb it.

For instance, Trump's reluctance to commit to NATO's collective defense principle or to uphold sanctions against Russia could be seen by Putin as a green light to continue his territorial ambitions. This is particularly evident in Trump's statements and actions that seem to prioritize a personal rapport with Putin over a consistent condemnation of Russian actions in Ukraine.

Moreover, Trump's advocacy for direct negotiations between the U.S. and Russia, potentially sidelining Ukraine itself, mirrors the Munich Agreement's exclusion of Czechoslovakia from discussions about its own fate. This approach undermines Ukrainian sovereignty and could set a precedent where international law and state integrity are negotiated away in backroom deals between superpowers.

The dangers of this strategy are manifold. Just as the Munich Agreement only delayed and escalated the conflict in Europe, Trump's potential concessions could lead to a more entrenched Russian presence in Ukraine, encouraging further territorial grabs or aggressive actions not just in Eastern Europe but potentially elsewhere. This could destabilize the region, much like how appeasement in the 1930s destabilized Europe.

Furthermore, the global perception of U.S. leadership might suffer if Trump's policies are seen as capitulating to autocratic aggression. Allies might question the reliability of the U.S. as a defender of democratic values and international law, thereby weakening the Western alliance's cohesion. This could parallel how Chamberlain's appeasement led to a loss of trust among European nations, ultimately affecting their collective response when war did come.

In conclusion, the lessons from 1938 are clear: appeasing an aggressor can lead to greater conflict and suffering. Trump's interactions with Putin, especially in the context of Ukraine, should be critically examined against this historical backdrop. The cost of peace through appeasement might not only be the temporary cessation of hostilities but the long-term erosion of international norms and stability, potentially paving the way for larger conflicts. As with Chamberlain, the narrative of peace might be short-lived, overshadowed by the reality of increased aggression and global instability.

Myk Mowczan - ‘My super power is that I am Ukrainian’: activist for Ukraine, ex-President of the Ukrainian Association of Western Australia. This piece was first published here and is reprinted with the author’s permission.