Putin used Central Asia as a 'hybrid war' training ground for Ukraine (part 2): The June 2010 ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan - and Russia’s involvement.

In the second part of our series about Russia’s ‘hybrid wars’ around its former empire, we look at the horrible, deadly ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan which broke out 15 years ago today.

BY ASKAT DUKENBAEV

While Russia’s role in the April 2010 political crisis in Kyrgyzstan (see part 1 of this article series) received a fair amount of attention in the West, Moscow’s involvement in the escalating crises that unfolded in the subsequent weeks and months has largely been overlooked or dismissed.

After President Bakiyev’s violent ouster in April 2010, an Interim Government headed by Kyrgyzstan’s former foreign minister, Roza Otunbayeva , took power. Although far from perfect, this was, without doubt, a pro-democracy government. A referendum on reducing presidential powers and strengthening the country’s parliament and democracy was announced for June 27, 2010.

That spring and summer, a number of crises appeared in the country. They all seemed to aim at undermining the Kyrgyz Interim Government. It all culminated in a bloody, ethnic conflict in the south of the country in June 2010, which further weakened Otunbaeyeva’s Interim Government, contributing to their defeat in the subsequent parliamentary elections in October – which saw a significant gain in seats for Russia-supported political parties.

In this part, I will look at the available evidence and argue that Russia had a vested interest in the June 2010 destabilization, aimed at further tightening its grip on Kyrgyzstan. Moscow’s interest appeared to persist even at the cost of escalating the situation into bloody interethnic clashes that claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, with about two thousand seriously injured, resulting in the destruction of thousands of houses and properties, and forcing several hundred thousand people to flee – both internally and across the border to neighboring Uzbekistan.

I am, of course, well-aware of the region’s history and the underlying causes of the conflict - many of which stem from the faultlines and discontents caused by the Soviet rulers’ ‘nationality policy’. This policy began in the 1920s as an anti-colonial approach towards the peoples of Russia but quickly evolved into an imperial practice of ‘divide and rule’ aimed at maintaining assertive and centralized control over its diverse regions.

I also share the well-argued view that the political and structural incapacities of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan to address decades-long growing social tensions, widespread disaffection, and increasingly anarchic tendencies (especially, in the aftermath of the April 2010 power change) - combined with external factors, particularly the growing rivalry between the United States and Russia – further exacerbated the situation. Furthermore, the undisclosed, unresolved and unlearned lessons from the earlier Kyrgyz-Uzbek violent clashes of June 1990 hindered interethnic healing as well as effective preparation and response.

What I am suggesting is that one important variable has been missing in our analysis of the 2010 ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan: Russia’s role. If experts agree that Russians were involved in the April events, what prevents them from being involved in the June events as well?

Russia’s role: Kyrgyz eyewitnesses and politicians

The first indications of Russia’s involvement in the June 2010 crisis were immediately evident to eyewitnesses on the ground, including both Kyrgyz and Uzbek individuals. Numerous firsthand accounts from Kyrgyz politicians who were present during those days point to an ‘external force’ – widely understood in the local discourse to mean Russia’s involvement – in the escalation of the violence.

These published accounts – coming from a wide range of prominent persons on Kyrgyzstan’s political scene – cannot be easily dismissed, even if one also must suspect attempts at self-justification or deflection of responsibility for numerous atrocities committed against the Uzbek population. It is worth remembering, however, that the brutal violence affected both ethnic communities, leaving deep scars in both communities.

Russia’s involvement in the April and June 2010 crises has been subtly, yet unmistakably, acknowledged by both former presidents Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Almazbek Atambayev.

For instance, shortly after fleeing to Belarus after he was violently ousted from the presidency on April 7, Bakiyev accused the new government of being ‘executors of an external force’ – a veiled reference to Russia. Bakiyev suggested that Moscow was displeased with his refusal to close the U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan.

Another Kyrgyz president, Almazbek Atambayev, was even more direct in his criticism: “Foreign generals have never done anything good,” he stated. “We know this from the actions of Tsarist generals in 1916, when about half of the population of northern Kyrgyzstan was exterminated. We are also aware of the role of foreign intelligence agencies in the 2010 events in Osh and Jalal-Abad, when more than 400 citizens were killed.”

Adding to these statements are numerous eyewitness accounts from key Kyrgyz political figures. The then mayor of Osh, the epicenter of the clashes, Melis Myrzakmatov, describes in his book ‘Men Izdegen Chyndyk’ (‘In Search of Truth’) an episode in which unidentified individuals from Russia approached him with a proposal to proclaim a ‘Southern Kyrgyz Democratic Republic’.

A similar proposal was reportedly made to Bektur Asanov, then-governor of the Jalal-Abad region, who stated in an interview with Azattyk (the Kyrgyz service of RFE/RL) that the individuals behind this proposal were representatives of Russian General Vladimir Rushailo, who earlier had been appointed as president Medvedev’s special envoy to Kyrgyzstan.

Emilbek Kaptagaev, then the head of the Interim Government’s apparatus, also recalls his meeting with Rushailo and his “provocative statements”. During the meeting that took place two days before the clashes began on June 10, 2010, Kaptagaev asserts that he would directly hold Rushailo responsible if “any mischief were to follow in the south[ern part of the country]”. Kaptagaev also draws attention to suspicious activities involving four FSB generals who were present in Osh on June 9, one day before the clashes started.

In any functioning democracy, such revelations would have sparked an immediate political scandal and formal investigation. But not in Kyrgyzstan, or elsewhere in this region, where many politicians still to this day appear reluctant - or even fearful - to mention ‘Russia’ or ‘Putin’ by name.

For those who – for whatever reason –might consider the testimonies of the Kyrgyz politicians unreliable, a second line of evidence comes from neighboring Uzbekistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then President Islam Karimov himself issued strong public statements, including at the United Nations General Assembly, alluding to interference by ‘third forces’ and ‘friends from abroad.’ While the Uzbek authorities also refrained from naming Russia directly, the implication was unmistakable.

Unfortunately, Karimov’s appeals to the international community – including to the United States and the European Union – largely fell on deaf ears. However, his message did resonate within Kyrgyzstan, among both Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities. Recognizing the fragility of the situation, Karimov chose to support the referendum and the Interim Government – for example, by facilitating the (hasty) return of hundreds of thousands of refugees of Uzbek ethnicity to the Kyrgyz Republic, their country of citizenship. For this, he faced intense criticism domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, President Karimov – despite his authoritarian credentials – was later credited with playing a crucial role in stabilizing the regional situation. Rather than directly intervening – through military means – in the neighboring country’s crisis, he wisely chose to prevent it from becoming another regional hotspot, an outcome that would have ultimately served Putin’s Russia by helping it maintain strategic influence over the region.

Russia’s role: snipers and weapons

The third type of evidence includes numerous reports of indiscriminate sniper fire and weapons distributed from unidentified vehicles (as a result, almost 70% of the dead and nearly half of the approximately two thousand people injured in the June 10-14 tragic events had gunshot wounds). Numerous witnesses reported the presence of ‘groups’ of individuals identifiable by colored bandannas or T-shirts of the same color or wearing military-type uniforms or fatigues, with or without emblems. However, the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) found insufficient evidence to determine whether these groups were acting under the direction or control of any individual or authority – due to the widespread availability of military or camouflage gear in local markets.

This cannot help but remind one of President Putin’s remarks four years later about ‘the little green men’, also without official insignia, invading Crimea – that they were, in fact, only “members of self-defense groups organized by locals who bought their uniforms and hardware in a shop, and as such had nothing to do with the Russian army.”

Back in Osh in 2010, a particularly significant piece of evidence is the widely circulated video of an apprehended Russian Spetsnaz operative (Russian special forces), whose camouflage clothing and professional demeanor raised serious suspicion.

According to his interrogators, he was captured distributing weapons in Uzbek neighborhoods, a claim corroborated by geolocation data from the video. These incidents, combined with reports from the Kyrgyz police forces about unidentified snipers – some of whom were apprehended but later mysteriously disappeared, and are believed to have been extracted by their Russian operatives – drive-by shootings, and intercepted vehicles carrying arms, reveal a clear pattern of external, particularly Russian, involvement.

For instance, Kyrgyz law enforcement officials reported arresting 20 snipers, including seven foreigners - quite ample power to wreak havoc in the already fragile and destabilized situation. Also, witnesses reported the distribution of weapons and ammunition by ‘unknown sources’ to the Kyrgyz crowds (but also to the Uzbek neighborhoods as shown in the case of the Russian apprehended operative mentioned above).

Russia’s role: chauvinist media, stereotypes, hate speech

Fourthly, the controversial role of Russian-language mass media – widely followed in the region then and now – must also be acknowledged as further evidence of biased narratives that were not at all conducive to de-escalation. And may even have contributed to further tensions. Russian state outlets reported extensively on the widespread havoc, the humanitarian crisis, showing scenes of burning neighborhoods, fleeing refugees, and overwhelmed hospitals.

For instance, one of the earliest reports came from the Russian state news agency Interfax – immediately republished by the Russian-language regional outlet Fergana.ru – along with video footage showing hundreds of Uzbeks gathering in Moscow calling for Russian intervention. While the speakers at the meeting stressed its ‘spontaneous’ nature (and the emotions of those involved are understandable), there is a sense that it was, in fact, carefully staged, especially considering Moscow’s actions against the Interim Government that followed. And the fact that the meeting took place in the Russian capital, where all public gatherings are closely managed, and ‘spontaneous’ meetings normally not allowed.

When the June 2010 mayhem broke out, mainstream Russian media as well as international outlets like Al Jazeera and CNN highlighted the humanitarian crisis and emphasized the plight of civilians in southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly Uzbeks who were disproportionately affected. But some - ostensibly liberal - Russian commentators revealed deep-seated ethnic and racial biases in their coverage.

This reflected a broader issue in Russian public discourse: the persistence of imperial and racial hierarchies in how Russian elites discuss Central Asia. Even among liberal or opposition voices, there was often a striking lack of empathy or nuanced understanding towards the region’s non-Slavic populations.

A revealing illustration of this mindset can be found in the words of Yulia Latynina – a well-known journalist in the Russophone world, former columnist for the liberal newspaper Novaya Gazeta, and one of the most popular ex-hosts at Echo of Moscow radio station. In a long blogpost published amid the turmoil of June 2010, Latynina wrote the following (excerpt):

“Kyrgyz are slaughtering Uzbeks. We can send troops into Kyrgyzstan, or we can choose not to - there are pros and cons to both decisions. Because if we are an empire, the white man’s burden, then we must intervene. If we are not an empire, let them kill each other. Especially since Osh is a nest of [Islamic] fundamentalism.”

Her framing, striking for its cold detachment and implicit racial logic toward Central Asians, underscores the enduring influence of imperial thinking - even among those who otherwise position themselves as critics of Putin and his regime. This kind of rhetoric of widely regarded journalists demonstrates how ethno-racial and orientalist biases are ingrained in Russian discourse (spanning both mainstream and extremist spectra), and continue to shape Russia’s media narratives.

Again, these narratives, propagated by reputed and purportedly liberal Russian influencers and opposition political figures (many of them by now actually in exile in Europe and North America) not only distorted the complex roots of the conflict, but also contributed to a climate that delegitimized and dehumanized the suffering of both Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities. This ‘normalization’ of prejudice against Central Asians has helped justify Russia’s self-proclaimed ‘civilizational’ role in the region for years.

Simultaneously, the violence was acutely exacerbated by widespread disinformation, particularly disseminated by Russian-language social media platforms across Russia and Central Asia. This derogatory propaganda, frequently featuring exaggerated atrocity narratives, depicting Kyrgyzstan as a ‘failed state’, was compounded by a flood of persistent, inflammatory rumors – many of which were transmitted through countless mobile phone calls – further fueling panic, mistrust, and hostility between communities on the ground. The involvement of Russian and Moscow-backed bloggers - as well as locally-based activists and operatives - in disseminating this sophisticated disinformation before and during the violence warrants deeper and more systematic investigation. (The same applies to the role of Russian structures in inciting numerous interethnic clashes between young men in the days leading up to June 10 – an effort that had aggravating and escalatory effect on the already incandescent Kyrgyz-Uzbek tension).

Russia’s role: Politicians messing about

Finally, in the lead-up to and during the 2010 ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, the role of Russia's political establishment was marked by a complex mix of implicit destabilization and strategic positioning. Although direct orchestration of the clashes by Russian officials remains unproven - except, perhaps, in the case of General Rushailo, as some high-caliber witnesses suggested (see part 1 of this series) – the actions and rhetoric of Russian politicians, which are closely followed by people in the region, without doubt added fuel to an already volatile situation in Kyrgyzstan after the April violent change of power.

For instance, in May 2010, Vladimir Zhirinovsky -- a longtime member of the Russian State Duma and a vocal proponent of the Kremlin’s long-term geopolitical ambitions -- publicly described Kyrgyzstan as a failed state, promoting narratives that reinforced the image of the country’s collapse and dysfunction.

“We appoint [General] Rushailo as the plenipotentiary representative in Bishkek, and this can then become the new Central Asian Federal District of the Russian Federation,” Zhirinovsky declared, signaling an expansionist vision under the guise of regional stabilization.

A few days earlier, on May 13, 2010, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev had appointed Vladimir Rushailo - a FSB general, former interior minister and CIS executive secretary - as his special envoy to Bishkek. Tasked with managing Moscow’s contacts with both the Interim Government and the opposition, Rushailo’s role reflected the Kremlin’s effort to shape post-April 2010 developments in Kyrgyzstan in line with Russian interests. He served in this capacity until April 2012, when he was dismissed without explanation.

Following Bakiyev's overthrow in April 2010, Russia was quick to de facto recognize the Interim Government led by Roza Otunbayeva - a decision that appeared uncharacteristic for Moscow, especially given its usual reluctance to endorse leadership changes resulting from popular uprisings. Vladimir Putin, then serving as Russian Prime Minister (2008-2012) – between his presidential terms – and widely regarded as the country’s de facto ruler, was among the first foreign leaders to recognize Kyrgyzstan’s new leadership. However, this swift recognition did not translate into unconditional support for the Interim Government (especially once ethnic violence erupted on June 10, just two weeks before the planned national constitutional referendum on June 27).

At the peak of the interethnic violence in June 2010, Russian propaganda had cultivated expectations of a CSTO intervention, leading many in Kyrgyzstan to anticipate Russia's direct involvement, including the Interim Government’s appeal – on June 12 – to Moscow for military assistance to restore order.

For instance, seemingly in response to this news, many desperate Uzbek residents in Osh painted “SOS” - the internationally recognized distress signal - on rooftops and roads. According to the report by the international Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission (KIC), they were hoping for immediate assistance delivered by air. Yet, Moscow abruptly declined, leaving its reasons officially unstated. In any case, the change of decision implies potential strong opposition from China as well as Uzbekistan. This is further underscored by the fact that, at that time, a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was coincidentally underway in Tashkent (June 10-11).

Following the June crisis, Moscow continued its deep involvement in Kyrgyz politics by supporting pro-Russian parties up to the October 2010 parliamentary elections, thereby hindering the development of a more independent and stronger democratic system in the country.

In summary, the combined weight of eyewitness accounts, official statements, intercepted arms, apprehended Russian operatives, disinformation campaigns, and political maneuvers forms a compelling mosaic of evidence of ‘hybrid warfare’. This evidence strongly implicates Russia in the destabilization of southern Kyrgyzstan, a process that began as early as 2009 and intensified by April 2010, culminating in the June 2010 crisis.

Epilogue

As previously mentioned, even though Moscow’s involvement in the Kyrgyz ‘revolution’ in April 2010 did receive attention in the West, subsequent events – especially the June crisis and ethnic violence – have been largely overlooked or dismissed by the international community, despite some warning voices.

A notable example is the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission – KIC), chaired by Finnish politician and diplomat Kimmo Kiljunen. During a press conference in Bishkek in May 2011, while presenting the findings of the investigation, Kiljunen responded to a question about third-party involvement by stating: “We have no evidence that any foreign state was involved in the events in the South.”

One of the key objectives of this article has been to challenge that conclusion and to call upon the international community to re-examine the events in Kyrgyzstan with a fresh perspective.

The region – squeezed between the ‘menacing northern arc’, as I call it, of Russia and China and the ‘unstable southern arc’ of Afghanistan and Iran – will require serious attention and support in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. This geopolitical crossroads must not be ignored, or it risks becoming a ‘shadow zone’ vulnerable to the malign influence of more powerful countries like China and Russia.

By 2025, the West seems to have gained a clearer understanding of the Kremlin’s subversive tactics, particularly in light of recent actions across European countries that provide support to Ukraine.

These insights not only validate the long-held suspicion among civil society activists and critical thinkers of Kyrgyzstan but also reinforce the need for renewed scrutiny of Russia’s actions in Central Asia. There is now enough circumstantial and contextual evidence to justify a new, independent investigation of the April–June 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan, supported by well-regarded international institutions. If not now, then perhaps in the future - when the Putin regime falls or transforms, and Russia becomes more open to external engagement.

Meanwhile, Russia’s hybrid (or ‘grey-zone’) tactics continue, for instance, with troubling signs such as unacknowledged cyber-attacks, or unexplained explosions of weapon warehouses in neighboring Kazakhstan (added to the years-long disinformation campaigns against the country’s multidirectional foreign policy, especially its relations with the USA, or against its nascent nation- and democracy-building processes).

These developments suggest that the Kremlin’s playbook has remained consistent – from the early 1990s to the present day – and Central Asia remains a key area of its strategic considerations.

Dr. Askat Dukenbaev is a scholar and activist from Central Asia. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from Kent State University in 2017. He is currently residing and working in Cleveland, Ohio.