Ukraine, Putin and the long lines of history: Is it time to roll out Kissinger?

My old professor often said that he disliked Henry Kissinger, but that the longer a war went on for, the more he would consult the old rascal. I hate to say it, but...

I find myself thinking more and more about Henry Kissinger. Aha. Not because I agreed with him about much, and certainly not on Ukraine or Vladimir Putin - but because day by day, more and more ‘experts’ seem to be channeling Henry K, even if they don’t quote him. Here is a little piece I wrote when he left us at 100 last November.

Henry Kissinger dies at 100. RIP.

At age 99, Henry Kissinger still studied and changed his mind about Ukraine.

Hats off to an old, brutal, clever clever realist – who often got the analysis right but the policy wrong.

When I was a student in the 1980s, Kissinger was possibly the most important text for many of my international relations teachers. I always admired that Kissinger actually bothered to study in depth what he talked about. And that he could actually write a decent sentence. When I got more experienced myself, I understood that although his analysis of the long lines of history was often spot on, his policy descriptions often failed, but sadly, only after having persuaded Western politicians to do the wrong thing.

I met him only once, in Moscow, and he impressed me with his' long lines' analysis—and we can only understand Putin and his ilk in Ukraine in 2023 if we truly understand the USSR of the 1980s and 1990s—most do not—but it was also clear to me that he was overestimating Moscow and underestimating what was going on in the other 15 (former) Soviet republics.

At first, Kissinger listened to Putin describing the fall of the USSR as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century" - and Kissinger urged the West to "show greater sensitivity to Russian complexities."

When Putin invaded Georgia in 2008, Kissinger still argued that "isolating Russia is not a sustainable long-range policy." In my mind, it is a correct assumption, but the policy description - and policy implemented by the mental pygmies who ran the world at that point - was wrong or, at least, misguided, weak, in fact, only enabling Putin.

Even after Putin had occupied Donbas and Crimea in 2014, Kissinger still wanted Ukraine to adopt neutrality: "If Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other." Again, this is possibly a correct analysis, but the policy prescriptions from it were weak, leading to soft Western reactions to Putin's war—yes, war—already from 2014. Too many politicians in the West listened.

For us who lived and worked in Ukraine at the time, that much was obvious: the West had fallen asleep.

In May 2022, three months after Putin had attacked Ukraine, Kissinger told the World Economic Forum in Davos that "negotiations need to begin in the next two months before it creates upheavals and tensions that will not be easily overcome."

As we now know, Kissinger was right on that one. Today, things – Putin’s killings – have gone way too far to return to ‘before.’

But, in the same breath, Kissinger got it wrong on the policy prescriptions as he often did: "Ideally, the dividing line should be a return to the status quo ante. Pursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine, but a new war against Russia itself."

He overestimated Russia's strength and, at the same time, underestimated just how far Putin was/is willing to go to stay in power. Kissinger wrongly—as many Westerners have done before and after him—assessed Putin and his policies according to Western logic.

Kissinger suggested that Putin would keep the parts of Ukraine he had occupied in 2014. He thought that after a ceasefire, those territories could be the subject of a negotiation.

Volodymyr Zelensky told Kissinger to f-off: "It seems that Mr. Kissinger’s calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time. By the way, in the real year 1938, when Mr. Kissinger’s family was fleeing Nazi Germany, nobody heard… then that it was necessary to adapt to the Nazis instead of fleeing them or fighting them."

Mykhailo Podolyak, an aide to Zelensky, was even clearer: "Unfortunately, Mr. Kissinger did not understand anything - neither the nature of this war nor its impact on the world order. The recipe that the former secretary of state calls for but is afraid to speak out loud is simple: appease the aggressor by sacrificing part of the territory of Ukraine with guarantees of non-aggression against other Eastern European states."

Kissinger replied: "I did not say that territory should be given up. I just implied that it should have a separate status in any negotiations." Ukraine and Crimea should be treated differently "because of their significance to Russia."

By January 2023, again at Davos, Kissinger, hats off, had studied the realities and changed his mind, now arguing that NATO membership for Ukraine, would be an "appropriate outcome - the idea of a neutral Ukraine under these conditions is no longer meaningful."

Henry was often right and wrong and cynical, but at least he studied and thought. My guess is that we will soon hear his views on how to get out of this mess, which is quoted as 'Ukraine fatigue' gathering pace—whether we like it or not.

PS: I am not equipped to talk about Kissinger and Cambodia, Vietnam, the war crimes he committed, South America, the Middle East, etc. - I understand that Henry did even worse things there; again, the discrepancy between good analysis and horrible policies, maybe? - but I read with pleasure others who know more than I do about these issues.

PS: Many - more frivolous folks than me - will quote Kissinger on power and sex. But to me the cleverest thing he ever said was on international relations - and 50 years later it is shamefully, idiotically, still true, and soon it will again)come back to bite our sorry arses in relation to Ukraine: “If I want to call Europe, who do I call?” Henry asked. Indeed, Henry, indeed.

(Andersen)