We have to defeat the orange one! Freedom in Europe depends on it. Anyone who thinks Putin will stop without gobbling up the other Eastern European countries is insane. We also must get serious about letting Ukraine defend itself.
The whole question of "... Ukrainian lives as equally valuable as Western lives” is lost in the narrative that's been influenced deeply by Russian propaganda. The question: "It is the third year of the war, and Putin still believes that it is he to whom concessions must be made. Why is that?” is being asked today only because of the success of the narrative spun by Russia. The inability of the West arises from its own weaknesses and dependencies, particularly industrial and economic. More so because they've allowed the critical arms manufacturing industry, and indeed much of its ecosystem, to slowly wither. An unfocussed US, confounded by Trumpism and it's own internal contradictions, stemming from the disasters of misguided wars in Iraq is in no position to create and drive a successful counter narrative. Europe's old NATO countries have appear to have lost the desire (and perhaps the ability) to do so.
> Sullivan argued that concern over the restrictions was overblown; considering that the ATACMS have a range of only 300 kilometers – not far enough to reach many Russian air bases – Sullivan said that lifting the restrictions would not be decisive.
I assume the West wants to avoid uncontrolled escalation.
He was stating it as a fact.
Insult? He was stating what he believed to be a fact. Can you refute his claim? I can only assume that Ukraine has other targets in mind that are within 300 kms range that would be effectively destroyed?
I’d like to give Ukraine everything they need except that which would ensure global escalation. If I were a Ukrainian soldier, I would want to give Russia everything they gave Ukraine and more. But the dichotomy is that we don’t know what the tipping point is, and I don’t think Ukraine cares as they’re fighting for survival.
The question to be asked is how serious is the threat of a Russian escalation to Europe, particularly NATO Europe. The "escalation" fear is again about the success of a narrative being spun by the Kremlin in the West, one that the West neither examines as deeply as it should, nor does it counter. The fear in the US and across NATO Europe is that it might not be able to get its arms industry rewired and running quickly enough. That's a real fear, but that has to be assessed against a realistic picture of Russia's industry, albeit with China's support. The US also fears that given the current status of the industry and the pace of manufacture, it might not have enough to counter China across the Indo-Pacific, and manage the Middle East. This is a real fear. But none of this would stop the US and NATO Europe to drive a counter narrative, if it hasn't been a house divided-- both internally and internationally.
Unfortunately that is probably the calculus. I’ve developed a low opinion of Russia’s war machine. It appears to be clumsy and poorly equipped. But then again, we shouldn’t read too much into it. So far the war seems to be stalled, but few analysts expected Ukraine’s defense to be as capable as it has proven to be.
As for manufacturing weapons, I am concerned but I tend to believe what you say.
The Commission on the National Defense Strategy created by Congress in 2022 clearly highlights the weaknesses in U.S. defense preparedness. It states: “The Commission finds that the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat. It needs to do a better job of incorporating new technology at scale; field more and higher-capability platforms, software, and munitions; and deploy innovative operational concepts to employ them together better. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need to prepare for new forms of conflict and to integrate technology and new capabilities rapidly with older systems…The Commission finds that the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners. A protracted conflict, especially in multiple theaters, would require much greater capacity to produce, maintain, and replenish weapons and munitions. Addressing the shortfall will require increased investment, additional manufacturing and development capacity, joint and coproduction with allies, and additional flexibility in acquisition systems.”
The decline of US advantages in this domain vis-à-vis China have been described starkly in the Commission’s report.
We have to defeat the orange one! Freedom in Europe depends on it. Anyone who thinks Putin will stop without gobbling up the other Eastern European countries is insane. We also must get serious about letting Ukraine defend itself.
Every time we (UK, etc.) hold out on tanks, jets, missiles, funding, it makes me ashamed. This is existential.
The whole question of "... Ukrainian lives as equally valuable as Western lives” is lost in the narrative that's been influenced deeply by Russian propaganda. The question: "It is the third year of the war, and Putin still believes that it is he to whom concessions must be made. Why is that?” is being asked today only because of the success of the narrative spun by Russia. The inability of the West arises from its own weaknesses and dependencies, particularly industrial and economic. More so because they've allowed the critical arms manufacturing industry, and indeed much of its ecosystem, to slowly wither. An unfocussed US, confounded by Trumpism and it's own internal contradictions, stemming from the disasters of misguided wars in Iraq is in no position to create and drive a successful counter narrative. Europe's old NATO countries have appear to have lost the desire (and perhaps the ability) to do so.
> Sullivan argued that concern over the restrictions was overblown; considering that the ATACMS have a range of only 300 kilometers – not far enough to reach many Russian air bases – Sullivan said that lifting the restrictions would not be decisive.
This is an insulting argument to make.
I assume the West wants to avoid uncontrolled escalation.
He was stating it as a fact.
Insult? He was stating what he believed to be a fact. Can you refute his claim? I can only assume that Ukraine has other targets in mind that are within 300 kms range that would be effectively destroyed?
I’d like to give Ukraine everything they need except that which would ensure global escalation. If I were a Ukrainian soldier, I would want to give Russia everything they gave Ukraine and more. But the dichotomy is that we don’t know what the tipping point is, and I don’t think Ukraine cares as they’re fighting for survival.
The question to be asked is how serious is the threat of a Russian escalation to Europe, particularly NATO Europe. The "escalation" fear is again about the success of a narrative being spun by the Kremlin in the West, one that the West neither examines as deeply as it should, nor does it counter. The fear in the US and across NATO Europe is that it might not be able to get its arms industry rewired and running quickly enough. That's a real fear, but that has to be assessed against a realistic picture of Russia's industry, albeit with China's support. The US also fears that given the current status of the industry and the pace of manufacture, it might not have enough to counter China across the Indo-Pacific, and manage the Middle East. This is a real fear. But none of this would stop the US and NATO Europe to drive a counter narrative, if it hasn't been a house divided-- both internally and internationally.
Unfortunately that is probably the calculus. I’ve developed a low opinion of Russia’s war machine. It appears to be clumsy and poorly equipped. But then again, we shouldn’t read too much into it. So far the war seems to be stalled, but few analysts expected Ukraine’s defense to be as capable as it has proven to be.
As for manufacturing weapons, I am concerned but I tend to believe what you say.
The Commission on the National Defense Strategy created by Congress in 2022 clearly highlights the weaknesses in U.S. defense preparedness. It states: “The Commission finds that the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat. It needs to do a better job of incorporating new technology at scale; field more and higher-capability platforms, software, and munitions; and deploy innovative operational concepts to employ them together better. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need to prepare for new forms of conflict and to integrate technology and new capabilities rapidly with older systems…The Commission finds that the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners. A protracted conflict, especially in multiple theaters, would require much greater capacity to produce, maintain, and replenish weapons and munitions. Addressing the shortfall will require increased investment, additional manufacturing and development capacity, joint and coproduction with allies, and additional flexibility in acquisition systems.”
The decline of US advantages in this domain vis-à-vis China have been described starkly in the Commission’s report.